​Years ago, one of our founders worked as a project manager at a Dutch water utility. His bonus depended on how many kilometres of pipe he replaced in a year. Three kilometres was good. Five was better.
So he did what anyone would do. He picked the easiest projects. Open ground rather than a city centre. No tram lines, no listed buildings, no complicated permits. Those projects moved fastest, which meant more kilometres, which meant a better bonus. He shared an office with a colleague and they kept score.
About a quarter of the network sat on the replacement list. Which pipes within that quarter mattered most was not something anyone could say, so the list worked as a pool. You reached in and pulled something out.
This was not laziness and it was not bad management. It was the only rational behaviour available. There was no information that would have let anyone choose better. Given a list of six thousand pipes and no way to rank them, picking the easy ones is not a failure of judgement. It is a reasonable answer to an impossible question.
What has changed since is not the judgement. It is the information.
On the networks we work with today, that list of roughly twenty-five per cent typically comes down to one or two per cent. Those are the pipes where replacement measurably improves how the network performs: fewer bursts, fewer supply interruptions, less water lost. The other twenty-three per cent are pipes that will happily stay in the ground for another decade or more.
On one Dutch network, a utility had drawn up a plan for roughly four hundred kilometres of replacement. Working through the same network with our software, the portfolio that actually improved performance came to about two hundred.
And this is where we should be honest with you, because our own team does not agree on what that means.
One of us says: that is four to five hundred million euros saved. The pipes were never going to fail. Replacing them changes nothing. Do not do it.
The other says: nothing was saved at all. The utility has a replacement budget. If two hundred kilometres come off the list, two hundred kilometres of other projects go on it. The money is spent either way.
Both of them are right, and the disagreement is not technical. It is a decision that belongs to a board, not to a piece of software. What the analysis gives you is not a saving. It is a choice you did not previously have. You can spend the same money and get a substantially better network. Or you can spend considerably less and get the network you were going to get anyway.
Which of those is right for you is not something we can tell you. It depends on what you want the network to look like in twenty years, and that question has no technical answer.
The pipes that fail are not usually the ones that are easiest to reach. That is the whole problem, and it took us a while to see it too. The bonus scheme was real. So was the absence of information.
If you would like to know what your own replacement list looks like once it has been ranked rather than pooled, that is a conversation worth having.
